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	&1 Introduction
Human capital accumulation plays an important role in the mechanics of
economic growth as a complementary factor to physical capital, technological
innovations and, with knowledge spillovers, to human capital itself. In turn,
economic growth stimulates the accumulation of human capital by raising
its return. Such bidirectional eﬀects are at the core of growth theories based
on endogenous human capital accumulation (e.g. Nelson & Phelps (1996)
and Lucas (2002)). In these theories, higher competitive wages are the usual
channel through which human capital is rewarded.
In this paper we focus on human capital accumulation as a key to tech-
nological innovation, either in the adoption of existing technologies or in the
development of new technologies. We use a dynamic general equilibrium
model where contracts are not enforceable, neither for workers nor for ﬁrms.
The limited commitment of workers means that they can always quit the
ﬁrm. The limited commitment of ﬁrms means that they can renegotiate the
payments promised to the workers after the investment in human capital
has been made. These contractual frictions aﬀect the accumulation of both
human and physical capital.
One contribution of this paper is to show that the way limited enforce-
ment of contracts aﬀects the accumulation of human capital depends on
barriers to the mobility of skilled labor. In particular, we show that high
barriers discourage the accumulation of human capital while low barriers
have a stimulating eﬀect. As a result, diﬀerences in ‘barriers to competition’
translate into signiﬁcant diﬀerences in incomes and welfare across economies.
Barriers that limit the value of redeploying human capital outside the
ﬁrm reduce the outside option of skilled workers. Consequently, if a ﬁrm
renegotiates the promised payments, the worker does not have a credible
mechanism for punishing the ﬁrm. Anticipating this, the worker does not
provide the eﬀort to acquire the skills. This is a typical time-inconsistency
problem.
If the worker could commit to staying with the ﬁrm and providing eﬀort
(one-sided commitment from the worker) the contractual friction could be
resolved by making advance payments to the worker. However, without this
commitment, advance payments are not incentive-compatible for the worker.
This emphasizes the importance of a double-sided limited commitment to
the results of this paper.
In line with existing Contract Theory, one can try to solve the commit-
1ment problem with an output-sharing agreement or by transferring total or
partial ownership of assets to the workers (e.g. Hart & Moore (1994)). But
with two-sided lack of commitment, such arrangements are still open to un-
veriﬁable de facto renegotiations (or skimming).
There is, however, a natural solution to the time-inconsistency problem:
for the ﬁrm to invest in complementary factors of production up to the point
where there is no discrepancy between ex-ante promised payments to the
workers and ex-post outside values. For example, in our economies the best
outside option for a skilled-worker is to enter into a contractual arrangement
with a new ﬁrm. Therefore, a credible investment policy for an incumbent
ﬁrm is to mimic the investment decisions of a new ﬁrm. However, when the
investment cost of new ﬁrms is high, their investment is low. Consequently,
investment by incumbent ﬁrms is also low. In contrast, with full or one-sided
commitment, incumbent ﬁrms do not mimic the investment decisions of new
ﬁrms, and only the latter are directly aﬀected by start-up costs.
Our results are ﬁrst illustrated with a simple two-stage model which is
then extended to a dynamic inﬁnite horizon set-up. The parametrization of
the inﬁnite horizon model allows us to quantify the ability of one particular
barrier—start-up costs—to account for diﬀerent levels of human capital ac-
cumulation and innovation, as well as cross-country income diﬀerences. The
baseline model accounts, roughly, for half of the cross-country income gaps
with the US. Even though this number should be taken with caution, given
the simplicity of the model, it shows that this mechanism can be quantita-
tively important, bringing a new perspective on the role of competition as
a factor of growth. We deliberately use a semi-endogenous growth model
(Jones (1995)) to explain income diﬀerences, as opposed to long-run growth
diﬀerences, since this is what the evidence on the potential role of start-up
costs suggests. We discuss this evidence in Section 2.
Our results can also be interpreted as saying that barriers to competition
determine cross-country positions relative to the ‘technology possibility fron-
tier’, without emphasizing a distinction between innovation and technology
adoption, which is consistent with the idea that even the implementation of
known technologies requires appropriate human capital. In contrast, Ace-
moglu, Aghion, & Zilibotti (2006) take the ‘technology possibility frontier’
as given and develop a theory where the ‘distance to the frontier’ determines
a country’s comparative advantage on innovation vs. adoption. Moreover,
while in their theory the cost of barriers depends on the position of a country
relative to the frontier, in our framework it is the barriers that determine the
2position of a country in relation to the frontier. The causality eﬀect is re-
versed and the policy implications are very diﬀerent. They argue the lack of
pro-competitive policies becomes more costly as countries approach the world
technology frontier, while our theory implies that the lack of pro-competitive
policies can determine a country’s position away from the frontier, as our
computations of the dynamical model show.
We also show how other barriers to mobility such as covenants (prevent-
ing a skilled-worker from working for a period in the same industry), can be
incorporated in our model to account for regional diﬀerences. For example,
the evolution of the computer industry exempliﬁes the eﬀects of both types of
barriers to competition. As Bresnahan & Malerba (2002) emphasize, this in-
dustry has gone through diﬀerent technological stages (from main- frames to
PCs and the Internet). Knowledge in this particular industry was geograph-
ically spread in many countries including Europe. Yet the United States has
persistently been the industry leader. According to them, this dominance
can be explained by “...the existence of a large body of technical expertise in
universities and the generally supportive environment for new ﬁrm formation
in the United States”, Bresnahan & Malerba (2002, page 69).
While lower barriers to business start-up may have favored the computer
leadership of the United States, diﬀerent enforcement of covenants—and in-
formational linkages across ﬁrms—may have determined the shift of regional
leadership within the United States. As argued by Saxenian (1996), Gilson
(1999) and Hyde (2003), Silicon Valley dominates over Route 128 due to
a Californian legal and social tradition of not enforcing post-employment
covenants, resulting in high labor mobility and knowledge spillovers.
This paper relates to diﬀerent strands of literature. In addition to the
ones already cited, at least two more should be mentioned. First, the labor
literature that studies the accumulation of skills within the ﬁrm (e.g. Ace-
moglu (1997), Acemoglu & Pischke (1999), Acemoglu & Shimer (1999)). In
this literature, higher outside values worsen the hold-up problem and lead
to lower accumulation of skills. In our framework, instead, higher outside
values increase human capital investment. Second, by emphasizing the role
of barriers to mobility, our work also relates to the literature that empha-
sizes the role of barriers to riches in slowing growth and explaining income
diﬀerences (Mokyr (1990) and Parente & Prescott (2002)).
32 Cross-country evidence on barriers to business start-up
Before describing the theoretical framework, we present here some cross-
country data suggesting a relation between the cost of business start-up—
which in our theory is one of the barriers to knowledge mobility—and cross-
country income. It is important to emphasize that our theory is broader
than simply capturing the impact of barriers to business start-up. Here, and
in the later application of the theory, we will focus on barriers to business
start-up only because this is the data we have available.
A recent publication from the World Bank (2005) provides indicators
of the quality of the business environment for a cross-section of countries.
It also includes proxies for barriers to business start-up. There are three
main variables. The ﬁrst is the ‘cost of starting a new business’. This is
the average pecuniary cost needed to set up a corporation in the country,
in percentage of the country per-capita income.1 The second proxy is the
‘number of bureaucratic procedures’ that need to be ﬁled before starting a
new business. The third proxy is the average ‘length of time’ required to
start a new business.
Figure 1 plots the level of per-capita GDP in 2004 against these three
indicators, where all variables are in log. All panels show a strong negative
correlation, indicating that the set-up of a new business is more costly and
cumbersome in poor countries.
The cost of business start-up is also negatively correlated with economic
growth. To show this, we regress the average growth in per-capita GDP from
2000 to 2004 to the cost of business start-up. We also include the 1999 per-
capita GDP to control for the initial level of development. We would like to
emphasize that the goal of these regressions is not to establish a causation
but only to highlight some key correlations that motivate our study. The
estimation results, with t-statistics in parenthesis, are reported in Table 1.
As can be seen from the table, the cost of business start-up is negatively
associated with growth even if we control for the level of economic develop-
ment. Therefore, countries with lower barriers to entry tend to experience
faster growth. This ﬁnding is robust to the choice of alternative years for
1The normalization of the cost of business start-up by the level of per-capita income
better captures the importance of barriers to business start-up than the absolute dollar
cost. What is relevant is the comparison between the cost of business start-up and the
value of creating a business. Although the dollar cost is on average higher in advanced
economies, the value of a new business is also likely to be higher.
4Figure 1: Barriers to business start-up and level of development.
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5Table 1: Cost of business start-up and growth.
Initial Cost
Constant Per-Capita of Business
GDP Start-Up
Coeﬃcients 15.55 -1.16 -1.04
t-Statistics (5.01) (-3.81) (-4.92)
R-square 0.150
N. of countries 140
NOTES: The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate
in per-capita GDP for the ﬁve year period 2000-2004. Initial Per-
Capita GDP is the log of per-capita GDP in 1999. The cost of
business start-up is in percentage of the per-capital Gross National
Income as reported in Doing Business in 2005 (also in log)
compute the average growth rate. The other proxies for barriers to entry—
speciﬁcally, the number of procedures and the time required to start a new
business—are also negatively correlated with growth but they are not statis-
tically signiﬁcant at conventional levels.
To summarize, the general picture portrayed by the data is that economic
development and growth is negatively associated with the cost of starting a
business. We have presented simple correlations which, of course, do not
imply causation. In the following section we present a model where barriers
to entry and, more generally, barriers to the mobility of knowledge or human
capital, lead to lower income and growth. We will return to the cross country
data presented here in the quantitative analysis of Section 6.
3 The model
There is a continuum of ‘workers’, of total mass 1, each characterized by a
level of human or knowledge capital ht. Their lifetime utility is
 ∞
t=0 βt(ct −
et), where ct is consumption and et is the ‘eﬀort’ to accumulate knowledge as
speciﬁed below. In addition to workers there is a continuum of of ‘investors’
of total mass m>1. Investors are risk neutral with lifetime utility
 ∞
t=0 βtct.
The risk neutrality implies that the equilibrium interest rate is equal to the
intertemporal discount rate; that is, r =1 /β − 1.
Production projects require the input of knowledge capital, ht, and phys-






We assume that workers do not save, and therefore, physical capital must
be provided by investors. The goal of this assumption is to diﬀerentiate the
roles of workers and investors: the ﬁrst as providers of human capital and the
second of ﬁnancial resources. If workers saved, they would be able to self-
ﬁnance the purchase of physical capital eliminating the contractual frictions
between investors and workers.2
Investors compete to hire workers in a Walrasian market by oﬀering con-
tracts that determine the investment in human and physical capital and the
compensation structure. We refer to the contractual arrangement between
an investor and a worker as a ﬁrm. For expositional simplicity we assume
that each investor can hire only one worker. However, the investor-worker
pair can also be interpreted as a speciﬁc project or unit within a large ﬁrm
with certain common features. First, the relationship with each worker is
governed by a speciﬁc contract; second, investors behave competitively (for
example, they can not collude to prevent workers’ mobility); third, workers
are in the short side of the market; that is, the ability to hire workers exceeds
the number of workers. In the model this is obtained by assuming that the
mass of investors is bigger than the number of workers (m>1).
As anticipated above, an investment in knowledge, ht+1 − ht, requires
eﬀort from the worker. The eﬀort cost function is denoted by:
et = ϕ(ht,h t+1;Ht),
where Ht is the economy-wide knowledge. The dependence on the aggregate
knowledge captures possible leakage or spillover eﬀects.
The function ϕ is strictly decreasing in Ht and ht, strictly increasing and
convex in ht+1, and satisﬁes ϕ(ht,h t;Ht) > 0. It is further assumed to be
homogeneous of degree ρ>1. With this homogeneity assumption the model
generates only long-term diﬀerences in income levels, and therefore, this is
a semi-endogenous growth model as in Jones (1995). The analysis can be
2Zero savings could also be interpreted as an endogenous outcome if workers discount
more heavily than investors. As long as the discount diﬀerential is suﬃciently high, workers
will not save in equilibrium.
7easily extended to ρ = 1, in which case we would have long-term growth
diﬀerences.3
Physical capital is knowledge-speciﬁc. When a worker upgrades the knowl-
edge capital, only part of the existing capital is usable with the new knowl-
edge. Knowledge upgrading is equivalent to the adoption of a new technology
that makes part of the existing equipment obsolete. Capital obsolescence
increases with the degree of knowledge upgrading. This is formalized by
assuming that the depreciation rate of physical capital is:






Because of capital obsolescence, there is an asymmetry between incum-
bent ﬁrms—whose capital depreciates with the use of more advanced knowledge—
and new ﬁrms, which, without capital in place, have a greater incentive to
hire workers with higher knowledge (Arrow’s ‘replacement eﬀect’).
Firms remain productive with probability p. Whether a ﬁrm survives
is revealed after the investment in knowledge. The assumption guarantees
that, after the investment, the mass of workers is larger than incumbent
(surviving) ﬁrms. As we will see, it also guarantees that the equilibrium is
unique when neither the investors nor the workers commit to the contract.
Because the uniqueness is achieved for any positive probability of ﬁrms’ exit
from the market, not matter how small, to facilitate the exposition we ﬁrst
consider p close to 1 and, in the characterization of the individual problems
we will ignore it. This would be the limiting equilibrium as p converges to
1. The characterization of the equilibrium with any value of p is provided in
Appendix G.
Competitive structure and barriers: In each period there is a mass 1
of investors who are in a contractual relationship with workers, and a mass
m−1 > 0 who are idle and could start new ﬁrms. Investors can borrow from
and lend to each other to ﬁnance the capital k at the interest rate r. The labor
market is competitive and opens twice, before and after the accumulation
3The model can be interpreted as a detrended version of an economy that grows at
the exogenous rate dictated by worldwide knowledge. Let Ht be worldwide knowledge
growing at rate ¯ g, with the eﬀort cost function, et =˜ ϕ(ht,h t+1;Ht,Ht), homogeneous of
degree 1. After normalizing all variables by Ht, the eﬀort cost function can be rewritten
as ϕ(ht,h t+1;Ht), which is homogeneous of degree ρ>1.
8of knowledge. Active and idle investors can participate, but the eﬀective
competition for workers created by potential new ﬁrms is limited by several
types of barriers. For the moment, we consider only barriers to business
start-up. The analysis of other barriers, such as the strict enforcement of
covenants, will be conducted in Section 7 with similar results.
Barriers to entry are modeled as a deadweight cost proportional to the
initial level of knowledge chosen by the ﬁrm. Given the initial knowledge
ht+1, the entry cost is τ · ht+1. The key results of the paper are robust to
alternative speciﬁcations of the entry cost. Our choice is only motivated by
its analytical convenience.4
4 One-period model
Before studying the general model with inﬁnitely lived agents, we ﬁrst con-
sider a simpliﬁed version with only one period that facilitates the intuition
for the key results of the paper. The analysis of the inﬁnite horizon model,
however, is still important because it allows us to derive the initial conditions
endogenously as steady state values and, more importantly, it allows us to
quantitatively explore our model in Section 6.
There are two stages: before and after the investment in knowledge. The
states at the beginning of the period are h0 and k0. After making the in-




second stage. In this simple version of the model we assume that physical
capital fully depreciates after production. The worker receives a payment w
at the end of the period, i.e. after the choice of h1. Payments before the
choice of h1 are not incentive-compatible because of the limited enforcement
of contracts for the worker. With only one period, we can ignore discounting,
as well as leakage or spillover eﬀects.
The timing of the model is as follows: The ﬁrm starts with initial states
h0 and k0. At this stage the worker decides whether to stay or quit the ﬁrm.
If the worker quits, she can be hired either by an incumbent ﬁrm or by a new
ﬁrm (funded by a new investor). If the worker decides to stay, she will exercise
eﬀort to upgrade the knowledge capital to h1 and the investor provides the
4For example, we could assume that the cost is proportional to the initial capital
kt+1, or to the initial output h
1−α
t+1 kα
t+1, or to the discounted ﬂows of outputs. The basic
theory and results also apply when the entry cost is a ﬁxed payment. The assumption
of proportionality allows for a continuous impact of τ while a ﬁxed cost would have an
impact only after it has reached the prohibitive level.
9funds to upgrade the physical capital to k1. After the investment, the ﬁrm
pays w. At this stage the worker can still quit, but she cannot change the
level of knowledge h1. The investor is the residual claimant of the ﬁrm’s
output.
4.1 Equilibrium with one-sided limited commitment
We ﬁrst characterize the equilibrium when at least one of the parties, either
the investor or the worker, commits to the contract. The commitment of one
party is suﬃcient for the implementation of the optimal investment. As we
will see, it is the limited commitment of both parties (double-sided limited
enforcement) that induces a deviation from the optimal investment. We start
with the characterization of the equilibrium when only the investor commits.
It will then be trivial to show that this is also the allocation when contracts
are enforceable for the worker only, or for both the worker and the investor.
With the investor’s commitment, the optimal contract can be character-
ized by choosing all variables at the beginning of the period to maximize
the total surplus, subject to the enforcement constraints for the worker. Let
D(h0) be the repudiation value for the worker before choosing h1,a n d  D(h1)
the repudiation value after choosing h1. These functions are endogenous and
will be derived below as the values that the worker would get by quitting
the ﬁrm. From now on we will use the hat sign to denote the functions that
are deﬁned after the investment in knowledge (second stage). The partic-
ipation of the worker requires that the value of staying is greater than the
repudiation value before and after the knowledge investment; that is,
w − ϕ(h0,h 1) ≥ D(h0)
w ≥   D(h1).
As we will show, the second constraint is always satisﬁed if the ﬁrst
constraint is satisﬁed. Therefore, in the derivation of the optimal policy, we




− ϕ(h0,h 1) − k1 +
 













10w − ϕ(h0,h 1) ≥ D(h0)
−w − k1 +
 










where the second constraint is the participation condition for the investor.
A quick glance at the optimization problem reveals that the investment
choices are independent of the payment w. The value of w is determined by
the division of the surplus which, at this stage, we do not have to specify. As
long as w does not violate the enforcement and participation constraints, it
does not aﬀect the investment in human and physical capital.
To determine the repudiation value before the choice of h1,w eh a v et o
solve for the value that the worker would get by switching to a new ﬁrm.
Because of competition among potential entrants, the value received by the












w − ϕ(h0,h 1) ≥ D(h0)





Therefore, D(h0)=S(h0) and, if the worker stays with the incumbent
ﬁrm, the payment w must be at least ϕ(h0,h 1)+S(h0). Formally, the par-
ticipation constraint in problem (1) becomes w − ϕ(h0,h 1) ≥ S(h0).
Problems (1) and (2) show the diﬀerent incentive to invest for an incum-
bent versus a new ﬁrm. On the one hand, new ﬁrms do not have any physical
capital and knowledge upgrading does not generate capital obsolescence. On
the other, they must pay the entry cost τh1, which discourages knowledge
and capital accumulation. This is clearly shown by the ﬁrst order conditions

















= ϕh1(h0,h 1)+τ (4)
11where the subscripts denote derivatives. The left-hand terms are the marginal
productivity of knowledge. The right-hand terms are the marginal costs.
For an incumbent ﬁrm, the marginal cost derives from the eﬀort incurred
by the worker plus the obsolescence of physical capital. For a new ﬁrm the
obsolescence cost is replaced by the entry cost.
Let hOld
1 be the optimal knowledge investment of an incumbent (old) ﬁrm
and hNew
1 the optimal investment of a new ﬁrm. The following proposition
formalizes the relation between barriers to entry and knowledge investment.
Proposition 1 The knowledge investment of a new ﬁrm, hNew
1 , is strictly
decreasing in the entry cost τ and there exists ¯ τ>0 such that hNew
1 = hOld
1 .
Proof 1 The ﬁrst order condition for the choice of k1 is α(k1/h1)α−1 =1















The proposition follows directly from these two conditions. Q.E.D.
In equilibrium there is no entrance of new ﬁrms at the beginning of the
period and the investment in knowledge is h1 = hOld
1 ,w h e r ehOld
1 is deter-
mined by (3). The potential entrance of new ﬁrms only aﬀects the payment
received by the worker. In the second stage there will be the entrance of new
ﬁrms (although the number is negligible because p   1). However, the level
of knowledge cannot be changed at this stage.
Before continuing we show that the equilibrium investment does not
change if both parties (or the investor only) commit. Because hOld
1 maxi-
mizes the total surplus, this must also be the equilibrium investment if both
parties commit to the contract. The same result applies if it is the worker
who commits. In this case the investor can renege on the promised payments
after the investment in knowledge. However, this problem can be solved by
making the payment w before the investment in knowledge. As long as the
contract is enforceable for the worker, there is no risk that she runs away or
does not exercise the eﬀort to acquire knowledge.
124.2 Equilibrium with double-sided limited commitment
We want to show ﬁrst that, when the investor can not commit to fulﬁll his
promises, he will renegotiate the contract after the choice of h1. To see this,
we must derive the value that the worker would get by quitting the ﬁrm
when her knowledge has already been chosen to be h1. This is the surplus
generated by a new ﬁrm that hires a worker with knowledge h1;t h a ti s ,
  S(h1) = max
k1,w
 








w ≥   D(h1)





Because of competition among potential entrants, the worker gets the
whole surplus, and therefore,   D(h1)=  S(h1). An incumbent ﬁrm will renego-
tiate the promised payment w if this is higher than   S(h1). The renegotiation
threat after the accumulation of knowledge is credible because the ﬁrm can
always replace the current worker with other workers. This could be either
a worker still employed by an incumbent (surviving) ﬁrm, or a worker who
separated from an exiting ﬁrm. Because in the second stage there are only
p<1 ﬁrms that are still alive but the mass of workers is 1, workers are in
the long side of the market relatively to incumbent ﬁrms. This implies that
they only get the reservation value.5
Given that the ex-post payment received by the worker is w =   S(h1), the
total utility from staying with the ﬁrm is:
−ϕ(h0,h 1)+w = −ϕ(h0,h 1)+  S(h1). (6)
If instead the worker quits at the beginning of the period, she will get
the surplus S(h0) generated by a new ﬁrm which started before making the








1 )+  S(h
New
1 )( 7 )
5We have ignored this probability in the contractual problem because we are looking
at the limiting case of p   1. The explicit analysis of p<1w i l lb ed o n ei nA p p e n d i xG .
13Equations (6) and (7) show that the value of quitting at the beginning
of the period, S(h0), is greater than the value of staying, as long as h1  =
hNew
1 . Therefore, the worker will quit unless the ﬁrm agrees to the same
knowledge investment chosen by a new entrant ﬁrm; that is, h1 = hNew
1 .I n
this way the worker keeps the repudiation value high and prevents the ﬁrm
from renegotiating.6
Proposition 2 Suppose that all ﬁrms have the same initial states (k0,h 0).
Then there is a unique equilibrium with aggregate knowledge H1 = hNew
1 .
Proof 2 See Appendix A.
Because hNew
1 is decreasing in τ (see Proposition 1), the accumulation
of knowledge decreases with the cost of entry. Therefore, with double-sided
limited enforcement, there is a negative correlation between barriers to entry
and the accumulation of knowledge.
To summarize, greater competition (lower barriers to entry) leads to
higher investment in knowledge. Because the investment is determined by
the optimality condition of new ﬁrms, this level is not necessarily eﬃcient for
incumbent ﬁrms. In particular, if τ is small, incumbent ﬁrms accumulate too
much knowledge. The presence of spillovers, however, may make the higher
investment socially desirable. We will re-introduce spillovers in the analysis
of the inﬁnite horizon model.
Remarks: There are two points to be emphasized. First, the importance
of p<1. If p was equal to 1, we would have the same number of workers as
incumbent ﬁrms in the second stage. This may lead to multiple equilibria.
Figure 2 illustrates the issue. The left-hand panel plots the demand and
supply of workers when p = 1. The supply is equal to 1 because there is
a mass one of workers. The demand comes from incumbent ﬁrms, which is
in this case is equal to 1, and from potential entrants. Incumbent ﬁrms are
willing to hire for any wage between h
1−α
1 kα
1 and   S(h1). Potential entrants,
instead, are willing to hire only if the wage is not greater than   S(h1). This
gives rise to the dotted line which overlaps with the supply of workers for
a range of wages. This implies that the wage is not uniquely determined
6This proves that, if the enforcement constraint for the worker is satisﬁed at the be-
ginning of the period, it is also satisﬁed after the investment in knowledge.
14in the second stage of the model. The right-hand panel, instead, shows the
market equilibrium when p<1. In this case there are only p<1 ﬁrms that
are willing to hire for a wage greater than   S(h1). As a result, the aggregate
demand of workers intersects the supply only once and the equilibrium wage



















Figure 2: Labor market equilibrium after the accumulation of knowledge.
The second point to be emphasized is that output sharing is equivalent
to promised payments. Thus, the assumption of limited enforcement for the
investor also applies to the promise of a share of output.
5 The inﬁnite horizon model
In this section we generalize the model to an inﬁnite horizon set-up. There
are two important gains. First, it allows us to derive the initial conditions
k0 and h0 endogenously as steady state values. Second, the inﬁnite horizon
structure is better suited to the quantitative analysis of Section 6.
We ﬁrst characterize the equilibrium with commitment and then we turn
to the case of double-sided limited commitment. The comparison between
these two environments clariﬁes the importance of double-sided limited en-
forcement for barriers to entry aﬀecting the accumulation of knowledge. To
present the results more compactly, we relegate most of the technicalities and
proofs to the appendix.
Before continuing, it will be convenient to deﬁne the gross output func-
15tion, inclusive of undepreciated capital, as follows:
π(ht,k t,h t+1)=
 










5.1 Equilibrium with one-sided commitment
We start by characterizing the environment where only the investor com-
mits. As in the one-period model, the equilibrium allocation with investor’s
commitment is equivalent to the allocation achieved when the worker com-
mits (with or without commitment from the investor). What changes the
equilibrium outcome is the limited commitment of both.
The analysis of the inﬁnite horizon model will concentrate on steady state
equilibria. Therefore, in the analysis that follows we ignore the aggregate
states as an explicit argument of the value functions.
Although in equilibrium there is no entrance of ﬁrms (more precisely the
number of ﬁrms entering is negligible), we still need to solve for the dynamics
of a new ﬁrm in order to determine the outside or repudiation value for
the worker. Even though the analysis is limited to steady states, newly
created ﬁrms do experience a transition to the long-term level of physical
and knowledge capital.
Let V (ht) be the repudiation value for the worker at the beginning of the
period, before investing in knowledge. This is the value that a worker with
knowledge ht would receive by switching to a new ﬁrm. Similarly, let   V (ht+1)
be the value of quitting after the investment in knowledge, and therefore, after
exercising the eﬀort to accumulate knowledge. The optimization problem
solved by a new ﬁrm that hires a worker with knowledge capital h0 at the
beginning of period 0 is:

















wj − ϕ(hj,h j+1;H)
 







wj − ϕ(hj,h j+1;H)
 
≥   V (ht+1), for t ≥ 0, and






π(ht,k t,h t+1) − wt − kt+1
 
≥ 0.
The optimal contract maximizes the value for the worker, subject to the
enforcement constraints for the worker (the ﬁrst two conditions) and the
participation constraint for the investor (non-negative proﬁts). The problem
is also subject to a non-negative constraint for wt.
For a worker hired by a new ﬁrm at time 0, after the investment in
knowledge, the value of the contract is:














subject to the same constraints as problem (9).
The key diﬀerence, with respect to the problem solved by a new ﬁrm
entering at the beginning of the period, is that the eﬀort to accumulate
knowledge has already been exercised and h1 is given at this point. Hence,
the current ﬂow of utility for the worker is only w0. This also explains why
the choice of knowledge starts in the next period.
Appendix B derives the ﬁrst order conditions for problem (9). Because
of the entry cost and the obsolescence of physical capital, the optimality
conditions in the entry period, that is when t = 0, are diﬀerent from the
optimality conditions in subsequent periods. The ﬁrst order conditions at
t =0a r e :
V (ht) ≤ wt − ϕ(ht,h t+1;H)+βV(ht+1)( 1 1 )
βπ2(ht+1,k t+1,h t+1) = 1 (12)
τ + ϕ2(ht,h t+1;H)=β
 
π1(ht+1,k t+1,h t+2) − ϕ1(ht+1,h t+2;H)
 
,(13)
where subscripts denote derivatives. A transversality condition must also be
satisﬁed.
The ﬁrst condition says that the value of quitting the current employer
cannot be greater than the current ﬂow of utility plus the discounted value
of quitting in the next period. The second condition equalizes the gross
marginal return of capital to its marginal cost, which is 1. The last condition
17equalizes the marginal cost of accumulating knowledge to the discounted
value of its return (greater production and lower cost of future knowledge
investment).
The ﬁrst order conditions after entering, that is, for t>0, are similar to
the ones derived above with the exception of condition (13), which becomes:
−π3(ht,k t,h t+1)+ϕ2(ht,h t+1;H)=β
 




Conditions (13) and (14) show the asymmetry between new and incum-
bent ﬁrms. While the marginal beneﬁt from investing in knowledge (the
right-hand side) is the same, the marginal cost (the left-hand side) diﬀers.
For new ﬁrms this includes the entry cost, τ. For incumbent ﬁrms the entry
cost is replaced by the depreciation of physical capital, −π3(ht,k t,h t+1).
We can now characterize the steady state equilibrium. Because in equi-
librium there is no entrance, all ﬁrms have the economy-wide knowledge H.
The convergence to the economy-wide average is the result of the spillovers
in the accumulation of knowledge. Because of this, ﬁrms with lower than
average knowledge tend to invest more. Thanks to the complementarity of
knowledge and physical capital, all ﬁrms accumulate the economy-wide level
of physical capital. The values of H and K are determined by conditions
(12) and (14) after imposing the steady state conditions, that is:






Appendix C shows that the steady state values of H and K are unique.
After solving for H and K, we can then solve for the steady state payment
w. This requires us to solve for the whole transition experienced by a ’new
ﬁrm’, as characterized by the ﬁrst order conditions (11)-(14). Even if in
equilibrium workers do not quit and new ﬁrms are not created, the payment
w depends on the value of a new ﬁrm V (H).
Conditions (15) and (16) also reveal that the entry cost τ does not aﬀect
the steady state values of K and H. We will see in the next section that this
does not hold in the case of double-sided limited commitment.7
7As we will show in Appendix G, when p is not arbitrarily close to 1, the steady state
with investor’s commitment does depend on τ. In this case the limited enforcement from
t h ei n v e s t o ra m p l i ﬁ e st h en e g a t i v ee ﬀ e c t so fb a r r i e r st oe n t r y .
185.2 Equilibrium with double-sided limited commitment
Let us start with the enforcement constraints imposed on the previous prob-
lem with investor’s commitment. These constraints, before and after the






wj − ϕ(hj,h j+1;H)
 






wj − ϕ(hj,h j+1;H)
 
≥− ϕ(ht,h t+1;H)+  V (ht+1). (18)
Appendix B shows that V (ht) > −ϕ(ht,h t+1;H)+  V (ht+1). This implies
that the investor has an ex-post incentive to renegotiate the promised pay-
ments. That is, the lack of credibility in the one-period economy is recurrent
in the inﬁnite horizon economy.
Let hNew
t+1 = f(ht) be the investment in knowledge chosen by a new ﬁrm
in the entry period, when the initial knowledge of the worker is ht and the
investor does not commit to the contract. The next proposition establishes
that, with double-sided limited commitment, incumbent ﬁrms choose the
same knowledge investment as new ﬁrms.
Proposition 3 With double-sided limited commitment, the knowledge in-
vestment chosen by an incumbent ﬁrm is equal to the knowledge investment
chosen by a new ﬁrm; that is, hOld
t+1 = hNew
t+1 = f(ht).
Proof 3 See Appendix D.
Since the ﬁrm can renegotiate the promised payments after the investment
in knowledge, the worker would not stay unless the ﬁrm agreed to the same
knowledge investment chosen by a new ﬁrm. In this way, the worker keeps
the outside value high and prevents the ﬁrm from renegotiating.
Let J(ht) be the repudiation value for the worker when neither the in-
vestor nor the worker commit to the contract. Furthermore, let   J(ht+1)b e
the corresponding value after the investment in knowledge. Given the above
proposition, the optimization problem for a new ﬁrm, which started at t =0 ,


















wj − ϕ(hj,h j+1;H)
 
≥ J(ht), for t ≥ 0






π(ht,k t,h t+1) − wt − kt+1
 
≥ 0,
and ht+1 = f(ht), for t>0.
Notice that only the initial knowledge h1 is chosen in this problem. Future
values are determined by the investment policy of future new ﬁrms; that is,
ht+1 = f(ht). We have not included the enforcement constraint after the
investment in knowledge since it is already imbedded in f(ht).
The solution to this problem involves a non-trivial ﬁxed point problem.
First, as in the previous problem, the enforcement constraints include the
outside value J(ht), which is derived from the optimization problem solved
by a new ﬁrm. Second, the policy function f(ht), which is taken as given by
an incumbent ﬁrm, is also the policy function obtained as the solution to the
same optimization problem. Solving for endogenous participation constraints
is relatively new in the literature since they are often imposed exogenously
by assuming autarky values.
A detailed characterization of the solution is given in Appendix E. It
should be noticed that conditions (11) and (12), derived in the environment
with investor’s commitment, are also valid in the case with double-sided lim-
ited commitment. The optimality condition for the accumulation of knowl-
edge, however, is diﬀerent. For new ﬁrms this is given by:





















For incumbent ﬁrms there is no optimality condition for the investment
in knowledge since they take as given the investment policy f(ht).
20Imposing the steady state conditions ht = ht+1 = H and kt = kt+1 = K,
conditions (12) and (20) become:




















Unlike the case in which the investor commits to the contract, these two
conditions are no longer suﬃcient to determine the steady state values of
H and K. The unknown function f(H) also needs to be determined. This
requires us to solve for a ﬁxed point problem. Denote by h  = ψ(h;f)t h e
policy function that solves problem (19), for given f. The policy function
satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition (20) and in equilibrium f(H)=ψ(H;f).
Because incumbent ﬁrms innovate at the same rate as new ﬁrms, condi-
tion (20) also determines the investment in knowledge of incumbent ﬁrms.
Therefore, in order to determine whether lack of commitment leads to higher
or lower investment in knowledge, we have to compare condition (22) to the
optimality condition when the investor commits to the long-term contract,
that is, condition (14).
Let HC be the steady state knowledge in the economy in which the in-
vestor commits, and HNC the steady state knowledge without commitment.
We then have the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Suppose that f1(H) ≤ 1. Then the steady state value of
HNC is strictly decreasing in τ and there exists ¯ τ>0 such that HNC >H C
for τ<¯ τ and HNC <H C for τ>¯ τ.
Proof 4 See Appendix F.
Notice that the proof is based on the assumption that f1(H) ≤ 1; that
is, the derivative of the policy function at the steady state equilibrium is not
greater than one. We have checked this condition numerically. Therefore,
when contracts are not enforceable for either party, neither for the worker nor
21for the investor, the start-up cost is harmful for the accumulation of knowl-
edge. With low barriers, the economy experiences a higher level of income
than in the economy with commitment. This could be welfare-improving if
there are spillovers in the accumulation of knowledge.
6 Quantitative application
In this section we use the model to quantify the contribution of the cost
of business start-up in generating cross-country income inequality. In the
quantitative application we focus on the ‘cost of business start-up’ because
of data availability. It should be clear, however, that our theory applies more
broadly to other barriers aﬀecting the mobility of knowledge.
We calibrate the economy to the United States and then we ask how much
of the cross-country income gap from the US can be accounted for by the
observed cost of business start-up. The discount factor, β, the production
parameter, α, and the depreciation parameter, δ, are calibrated to replicate
the following moments: an interest rate of 5 percent, a capital income share
of 33 percent, and a capital-output ratio of 3. This implies β =0 .9524,
α =0 .33, and δ =0 .06. Notice that the three moments are invariant to the
entry barrier τ, and therefore, they are constant across countries.8
The eﬀort cost function is derived from the accumulation equation for the
stock of knowledge, which is assumed to take the form:









where Ht is the average level of knowledge, et is the eﬀort cost of accumulating
knowledge and φ is the depreciation rate. The parameter ν<1c a p t u r e st h e
return to scale in the accumulation of knowledge and θ<1 the leakage or
spillover eﬀects. Inverting, we get the cost function:
et = ϕ(ht,h t+1;Ht)=








8While it is easy to see the mapping between the ﬁrst two moments and the ﬁrst
two parameters (β =1 /(1 + r)a n dα = rK/Y), less obvious is the mapping between δ
and the capital-income ratio. From condition(12), evaluated at the steady state, we have
βπ2(H,K,H)=β[1 − δ + α(K/H)α−1] = 1. Given the output function Y = H1−αKα,
the capital-output ratio can be written as K/Y =( K/H)1−α. Using this expression to
eliminate K/H in the previous condition, we get β[1−δ+α/(K/Y )] = 1. Therefore, after
choosing β and α, the parameter δ is uniquely determined by the capital-output ratio.
22which is homogeneous of degree ρ =( 1− θν)/(1 − θ)ν.
The depreciation of knowledge results from working directly with the
stationary version of the model, detrended by the rate of worldwide knowl-
edge. The parameter φ is then approximately equal to the exogenous rate
of growth.9 Assuming that the economy grows at 1.8 percent per year, we
set φ =0 .018. This is about the average growth rate in per-capita GDP
experienced by the US during the last century.
The values of the other two parameters, θ and ν, are more controversial.
Manuelli & Seshadri (2005) uses a similar speciﬁcation of the investment
function, within an overlapping generation model, but without externalities.
In order to generate some key properties of the life-time proﬁle of earnings,
they choose a return to scale of 0.93. This is also the value estimated by
Heckman, Lochner, & Taber (1998). We use this value to calibrate ν on the
assumption that there is suﬃcient intergenerational transmission of human
capital.10 For the baseline parametrization we also follow Manuelli & Se-
shadri (2005) and assume no externalities, that is, θ = 0. The sensitivity
analysis will clarify how the results depend on the choice of θ and ν.
6.1 Results
Figure 3 plots the values of per-capita GDP and start-up costs for diﬀerent
countries. The ﬁgure also plots the values predicted by the model. As can
be seen, the cost of business start-up captures a substantial amount of cross-
country income variability.
To compute the average income gap from the US captured by the model,






t )ν,w h e r eHt is the worldwide knowledge, external to an individual country,
which grows at the constant rate ¯ g. Normalizing all terms by Ht, the investment function
becomes ht+1 =( 1− φ)ht + A(Hθ
t e
1−θ
t )ν,w h e r eφ =¯ g/(1 + ¯ g)   ¯ g and A =1 /(1 + ¯ g).
Because A acts as a rescaling factor, we can set A =1 .
10In Manuelli & Seshadri (2005) the cost of human capital investment has two com-
ponents: time and expenditures. Our speciﬁcation does not distinguish between these
components and the investment cost is captured by the single variable e.H o w e v e r , t h i s
does not alter in important ways the main properties of the model. As Manuelli and
Seshadri show, the key parameter to replicate the life-time earning proﬁle is not the rela-
tive importance of the two inputs but the return-to-scale parameter. Notice also that the
depreciation rate φ =0 .018 is also equal to the value chosen by Manuelli and Seshadri.
23Figure 3: Entry cost and cross-country output per capita - Data and model.
we compute the following index:
Index = 1 −
 
i |ˆ yi − yi|
 
i |yUS − yi|
,
where yi is the actual income of country i,ˆ yi is the income predicted by
the model, given the observed cost of business start-up, and yUS is the US
income. The model has been normalized so that it replicates US income;
that is, ˆ yUS = yUS. The index is 1 if the model replicates perfectly the actual
cross-country incomes, that is, ˆ yi = yi. It is zero if the cost of business
start-up has no impact on the equilibrium income; that is, ˆ yi = yUS.F o r
the baseline calibration the index is 0.51. Therefore, the model accounts for
roughly half of the cross-country income gaps from the US.
Next we show how the values of θ and ν aﬀect the results. Table 2
reports the income gaps accounted for by the model for alternative values of
these parameters. The general ﬁnding is that the model is more successful
the higher the return to scale, ν, and the lower the externalities, θ.T h e
24sensitivity is especially high for the return to scale. However, even for small
returns to scale, the model accounts for a non-negligible fraction of cross-
country income gaps. Even if we take the extreme parametrization chosen
by Parente & Prescott (2002), ν =0 .6, the model still accounts for about 11
percent of the income gaps.
Table 2: Income gaps accounted for by the model.
Value of ν
0.97 0.93 0.90 0.80 0.70 0.60
Value of θ
0.0 0.68 0.51 0.42 0.26 0.18 0.13
0.1 0.66 0.48 0.40 0.25 0.17 0.12
0.2 0.64 0.46 0.37 0.23 0.15 0.11
0.3 0.62 0.43 0.35 0.21 0.14 0.10
0.4 0.59 0.40 0.32 0.19 0.12 0.09
We have also calculated the ‘domestic socially optimal’ steady-state level
of output, that is, the output resulting from solving the problem of a country’s
planner. This diﬀers from the competitive output because of the externality
at the domestic level, represented by θ. It also diﬀers from the ‘global socially
optimal’ steady-state level of output, which is the solution to the problem
of a ‘global planner’, which internalizes the worldwide leakage, or spillover,
represented by ν. The steady-state values of H and K in the domestic planner








These are similar to conditions (15) and (16) except for the additional
term ϕ3(H,H;H) in the second equation. This term captures the externality
taken into account by the planner but ignored by the atomistic agents.
25Table 3 reports the ‘competitive’ output as a fraction of the ‘domestic
socially optimal’ output when there are no barriers to entry. A value greater
than 1 means that there is over-accumulation of knowledge compared to the
socially optimal level. As expected, this arises when the spillovers are small
or zero; that is, when θ is small. In this case moderate barriers to business
start-up would be welfare improving. On the other hand, values smaller
than 1 mean that there is under-accumulation of knowledge compared to the
socially optimal level. In this case barriers to entry are always suboptimal,
while moderate subsidies could improve welfare. As can be seen from the
table, the under-accumulation of knowledge arises for moderate spillovers.
Table 3: Steady-state output when contracts are not enforceable and there
are no barriers to entry. Numbers are relative to the socially optimal output.
Value of ν
0.97 0.93 0.90 0.80 0.70 0.60
Value of θ
0.0 1.81 1.28 1.18 1.08 1.04 1.03
0.1 0.80 0.92 0.95 0.99 1.00 1.00
0.2 0.41 0.71 0.80 0.92 0.96 0.98
0.3 0.25 0.58 0.70 0.88 0.94 0.97
0.4 0.17 0.51 0.64 0.84 0.92 0.96
7 Covenants and other barriers to mobility
Other barriers to the mobility of knowledge capital may have an eﬀect in our
model which is similar to the cost of business start-up. As we have discussed
in the Introduction, even within a similar legal and economic environment—
resulting in similar costs for business start-up—there may be diﬀerences in
other barriers. Covenants is one of them. A covenant which is ex-post
enforced prevents the worker from using her acquired knowledge if she moves
to another ﬁrm.
A natural way to model non-competitive covenants is by assuming that
26a quitting worker can only use a fraction ξ of her accumulated knowledge
in a new ﬁrm. This formulation also captures the case in which part of the
knowledge can not be used by the worker due to the enforcement of IPR
if she does not have full control of the patent. In our formulation, a more
stringent enforcement of covenants (or IPRs) is captured by a lower fraction
ξ.
To keep the presentation brief, we limit the analysis to the one-period
model. The extension to an inﬁnite horizon will follow the same logic as
in the analysis with entry costs. The problem solved by a new ﬁrm which











w − ϕ(h0,h 1) ≥ D(h0)




The problem solved by an incumbent ﬁrm is as in problem (1). The ﬁrst


















= ϕh1(h0,h 1) · ξ
α−1. (25)
Because ξ<1a n dα<1, the term ξα−1 > 1. Therefore, covenants have
the eﬀect of increasing the cost of accumulating knowledge and act similarly
to the entry cost τ. Proposition 1 becomes:
Proposition 5 The knowledge investment of a new ﬁrm hNew is strictly
increasing in ξ and there exists ¯ ξ>0 such that hNew = hOld.
Proof 5 Using the ﬁrst order condition for the choice of physical capital,
which is α(k1/h1)α−1 =1for both incumbent and new ﬁrms, the above ﬁrst














The proposition follows directly from these two conditions. Q.E.D.
All the results obtained in Section 4 trivially extend to the case of covenants
and other similar barriers to the mobility of knowledge.
8 Conclusion
We have developed a theory in which barriers to knowledge mobility aﬀect
the accumulation of knowledge, and therefore the level of income. The theory
does not simply say that “competition enhances income”. It shows how dif-
ferent forms of contract enforcement aﬀect the relation between competition,
accumulation of human capital and economic development. In particular,
when both investors and workers can not commit to long-term contracts,
the accumulation of human capital is determined by those ﬁrms that value
human capital the most, that is, start-up ﬁrms. As a result, high levels of
human capital accumulation are associated with low barriers to the mobility
of knowledge. In the absence of barriers the accumulation of knowledge can
be suboptimal at the ﬁrm level but could be welfare improving if there are
spillovers.
In a semi-endogenous growth model we have shown that barriers to busi-
ness start-up have the potential to explain signiﬁcant cross-country income
diﬀerences. This is the ﬁrst step to bringing our theory to the data. We have
also shown that other barriers to knowledge mobility, such as strict enforce-
ment of Covenants or Intellectual Property Rights, can have similar eﬀects,
suggesting a wide scope for the empirical application of the theory.
28A Proof of Proposition 2
We show that there is a unique equilibrium in which all ﬁrms implement h1 = hNew
1 ,
with the exception of one ﬁrm implementing the policy h1 = hOld
1 . Because each
ﬁrm is of mass zero, the deviating ﬁrm is negligible to the aggregate outcome.
Let h1 be the policy choice given h0. The promised payment associated with
this policy is w(h1)=S(h0)+ϕ(h0,h 1) ,w h e r ew em a k ee x p l i c i tt h ed e p e n d e n c eo f
the payment on the investment policy h1.D e ﬁ n e˜ h(h1) the knowledge that makes
the worker ex-post indiﬀerent between keeping the promised payment w(h1), or
moving to a new ﬁrm with initial knowledge ˜ h(h1). Formally,   S(˜ h(h1)) = w(h1).
From the deﬁnition of   S provided in equation (5), we have that ˜ h(hNew
1 )=hNew
1 .
Moreover, from (4), (6) and (7) we have that, if h1  = hNew
1 ,t h e nw(h1) >   S(h1).
Because   S(h1) is strictly increasing in h1,t h i si m p l i e st h a t˜ h(h1) >h 1.
Now consider a ﬁrm implementing the policy h1 = hOld
1 .I f hOld
1  = hNew
1 ,a s
l o n ga st h e r ei so n ew o r k e ro u t s i d et h eﬁ r mw i t hh1 ∈ [hOld
1 ,˜ h(hOld
1 )), the investor
will not pay the promised w(hOld
1 )s i n c eh ec a na l w a y sh i r es u c hw o r k e rw i t ha
lower payment. Anticipating this, the worker will not participate because the ex-
ante value of quitting the ﬁrm, S(h0), is higher (recall (7)). On the other hand,
if no other worker outside the ﬁrm has knowledge h1 ∈ [hOld
1 ,˜ h(hOld
1 )), then the
investor’s promise w(hOld
1 )i sc r e d i b l e .
The above argument shows that the unique optimal policy (up to removal of










1 if ∃ another ﬁrm with h1 ∈ [hOld
1 ,˜ h(hOld
1 ))
This policy induces a unique equilibrium where only one ﬁrm implements h1 =
hOld
1 , while all other ﬁrms implement h1 = hNew
1 .
To complete the proof we only need to show that, if hNew
1 >h Old
1 ,t h e nhNew
1 >
˜ h(hOld
1 ). This ensures that workers with h1 = hNew
1 are not used to replace workers
with h1 = hOld
1 . To show this, consider condition (7). This implies that w(hOld
1 )=
ϕ(h0,h Old
1 ) − ϕ(h0,h New
1 )+  S(hNew




1 ) <   S(hNew
1 ). Because w(hOld
1 )=  S(˜ h(hOld




B First order conditions with investor’s commitment
We ﬁrst prove the following lemma:
29Lemma 1 The enforcement constraint ‘after’ the investment in knowledge is sat-
isﬁed if the enforcement constraint is satisﬁed ‘before’ the investment in knowledge.












wj − ϕ(hj,h j+1;H)
 
≥− ϕ(ht,h t+1;H)+  V (ht+1).
Therefore, to show that the second constraint is satisﬁed when the ﬁrst constraint
is satisﬁed, it is enough to show that V (ht) ≥− ϕ(ht,h t+1;H)+  Vt(ht+1) for any
value of ht+1.B e c a u s eV (ht)=m a x h{−ϕ(ht,h;H)+  V (h)}, we have that:
V (ht)=m a x
h
 
− ϕ(ht,h;H)+  V (h)
 
≥− ϕ(ht,h t+1;H)+  V (ht+1)
for any ht+1. Q.E.D.
Let us now consider problem (9). Thanks to the above lemma we can ignore
the enforcement constraint after the investment in knowledge. Let γt be the La-
grange multiplier associated with the enforcement constraint before the investment
in knowledge and λ0 the Lagrange multiplier associated with the participation con-




































Deﬁne μt recursively as follows: μt+1 = μt + γt,w i t hμ0 =0 . U s i n gt h i s








wt − ϕ(ht,h t+1;H)
 













30This problem becomes recursive at any t>0. Therefore, we can rewrite it as
follows:












w0 − ϕ(h0,h 1;H)
 
(26)
−μ1V (h0)+βW(μ1,h 1,k 1)
 
,
with the function W is deﬁned recursively as follows:













wt − ϕ(ht,h t+1;H)
 




The ﬁrst optimization problem (equation (26)) is the problem solved by a
new ﬁrm with initial state h0 and for a given λ0. The Lagrange multiplier λ0
is determined such that the participation constraint for the investor is satisﬁed.
The tighter this constraint is, the higher the value of λ0. The second optimization
problem (equation (27)) is the one solved after entering. Therefore, this is the
problem solved by an incumbent ﬁrm that starts with states μt, ht and kt.
Taking derivatives in problem (26) gives:
V (ht) ≤− ϕ(ht,h t+1;H)+wt + βV(ht+1) (28)
1+μt+1 ≤ λ0 (29)
βπ2(ht+1,h t+1,k t+1) = 1 (30)
λ0τ +( 1+μt+1)ϕ2(ht,h t+1;H)=βW2(μt+1,h t+1,k t+1), (31)
for t =0a n dw i t ht h ee n v e l o p et e r mg i v e nb y :
W2(μt,h t,k t)=λ0π1(ht,k t,h t+1) − (1 + μt+1)ϕ1(ht,h t+1;H) − (μt+1 − μt)V1(ht).
The ﬁrst-order conditions in problem (27) are (28)-(30) and
−λ0π3(ht,k t,h t+1)+( 1+μt+1)ϕ2(ht,h t+1;H)=βW2(μt+1,h t+1,k t+1). (32)
As emphasized above, the value of λ0 depends on the tightness of the partic-
ipation constraint for the investor. Assume that a new ﬁrm can choose h1 <h 0
31without any cost. This is equivalent to assuming that the worker chooses to de-
stroy part of her knowledge. We can then prove that the investor is able to break
even if the contract chooses the unconstrained sequence of h. This implies that
λ0 = 1 and, from condition (29), μt =0f o ra l lt. Using this and substituting the
envelope term, conditions (28), (30), (31) and (32) become (11)-(14). Q.E.D.
C Steady state equilibrium when the investor commits
Proposition 6 There is a unique steady state equilibrium in which all ﬁrms have
t h es a m ek n o w l e d g eH and physical capital K.
Proof 6 Consider condition (16), which we rewrite here as follows:
ϕ2(H,H;H)+βϕ1(H,H;H)=π3(H,K,H)+βπ1(H,K,H).
The right-hand term remains constant for any value of H. In fact, taking
into account the functional form of π (see equation (8)), we have π3(H,K,H)=
−δ(K/H) and π1(H,K,H)=δ(K/H)+( 1− α)(K/H)α.T h e s et w ot e r m so n l y
depend on the ratio K/H. From condition (15) we have βπ2(H,K,H)=β[1 +
α(K/H)α−1]=1 , which uniquely determines the ratio K/H.
Let us now look at the left-hand term. Because ϕ is homogenous of degree
ρ>1, the derivatives ϕ1 and ϕ2 are homogeneous of degree ρ − 1. Therefore, the






Because ρ>1,t h i st e r mi ss t r i c t l yi n c r e a s i n gi nH, converges to zero as H → 0
and to inﬁnity as H →∞ . Therefore, there exists a unique value of H that solves
this condition. The uniqueness of H then implies the uniqueness of K. Q.E.D.
D Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose that the knowledge investment chosen by a new ﬁrm is diﬀerent from
that chosen by an incumbent ﬁrm. Denote by hNew
t+1 and hOld
t+1 the investment of
new and incumbent ﬁrms, respectively. Because hNew
t+1 solves the problem Vt(ht)=
maxht+1{−ϕ(ht,h t+1;H)+  Vt(ht+1)}, it follows that:




t+1  = hNew
t+1 . But then constraints (17) and (18) cannot both be satisﬁed.
Therefore, the only feasible solution is ht+1 = hNew
t+1 . Q.E.D.
32E Derivation of the ﬁrst order condition (20)
Following the same steps as Appendix B, we can show that in a steady state
equilibrium, problem (19) can be reformulated as:


















with the function W is deﬁned recursively as follows:















−(μt+1 − μt)J(ht)+βW(μt+1,f(ht),k t+1)
 
for all t>0.
The ﬁrst order condition with respect to h1 in problem (33) gives:
λ0τ +( 1+μ1)ϕ2(h0,h 1;H)=βW2(μ1,h 1,k 1), (35)



















−(μt+1 − μt)J1(ht)+βW2(μt+1,h t+1,k t+1)f1(ht).
With limited enforcement, condition (35) must be satisﬁed at any point in


















Also, in this case we can prove that the unconstrained investment in knowledge
capital allows the investor to break even. Therefore, λ0 = 1 and μt =0 . U s i n g
this result and substituting the envelope in (35) we get condition (20). Q.E.D.
33F Proof of Proposition 4
In the steady state without commitment, potential new ﬁrms start with the same










which determines the steady state knowledge for incumbent and new ﬁrms when
the investor does not commit (double-sided limited enforcement).
This condition must be compared to the optimality condition that determines
the steady state knowledge when the investor commits to the contract (one-side






The homogeneity of degree ρ of the cost function ϕ implies that the derivatives













Hρ−1 = βπ1(H,K,H)+π3(H,K,H). (38)
Because ρ − 1 > 0, the left-hand terms are strictly increasing in H, converge to
zero as H → 0a n dt oi n ﬁ n i t ya sH →∞ . We further observe that, as shown in
the proof of Proposition 6, the terms π1 and π3 only depend on the ratio K/H.
This term is uniquely pinned down by condition (12), which is the same for both
economies. Therefore, π1(H,K,H)a n dπ3(H,K,H) do not change as H changes.
Consider ﬁrst the case with zero start-up cost, that is, τ =0 . I ff1(H) ≤ 1,
as postulated in the proposition, the term βf1(H) < 1. Because π3(H,K,H) < 0
and βf1(H) < 1, the right-hand side of (37) is bigger than the right-hand side of
(38) for a given H. This implies that the value of H in the ﬁrst equation must
be bigger than in the second, that is, HNC >H C. Without capital obsolescence,
π3(H,K,H) = 0, and therefore, (37) and (38) are indistinguishable if τ =0 .
Let us now consider the case τ>0. This variable only aﬀects condition (37).
Because βf1(H) < 1, an increase in τ reduces the right-hand side of (37), which
requires a lower value of H. For a suﬃciently large τ, the steady-state level of
knowledge declines to the point in which HNC <H C. Q.E.D.
34G The role of barriers when the probability of survival is p<1
We keep the assumption that the survival of the ﬁrm is observed after the invest-
ment in knowledge. Therefore, the level of ht+1 is predetermined for new ﬁrms.
The physical capital, however, is only chosen after it is known that the ﬁrm will
survive. This is not essential for the properties of the equilibrium but it simpliﬁes
its characterization.
If an incumbent ﬁrm survives, the worker receives wt and stays with her current
employer. If the ﬁrm exits, the worker is hired by a new ﬁrm and receives the
lifetime utility   V (ht+1). We can then deﬁne the pseudo utility ﬂow for the worker
as follows:
U(ht,h t+1,w t;H) ≡− ϕ(ht,h t+1;H)+pwt +( 1− p)  V (ht+1).
The problem with investor’s commitment is similar to (9) after making the
following changes: the term wt−ϕ(ht,h t+1;H)i sr e p l a c e dw i t hU(ht,h t+1,w t;H);
future ﬂows are discounted by pβ; the ﬁrm pays wt +kt+1 only in case of survival.
After making these changes, we repeat the steps used in Appendix B for the
case with p = 1. The ﬁrst order conditions for a new ﬁrm at t =0a r e :
V (ht) ≤− ϕ(ht,h t+1;H)+pwt +( 1− p)  V (ht+1)+pβV (ht+1) (39)
1+μt+1 ≤ λ0 (40)
βπ2(ht+1,k t+1,h t+1) = 1 (41)
λ0τ +( 1+μt+1)ϕ2(ht,h t+1;H)=
(1 + μt+1)(1 − p)   D1(ht+1)+pβW2(μt+1,h t+1,k t+1), (42)
with the envelope term given by:
W2(μt,h t,k t)=λ0π1(ht,k t,h t+1) − (1 + μt+1)ϕ1(ht,h t+1;H) − (μt+1 − μt)V1(ht).
The ﬁrst order conditions for t>0 (incumbent ﬁrm) are (39)-(41) and
−λ0π3(ht,k t,h t+1)+( 1+μt+1)ϕ2(ht,h t+1;H)=
(1 + μt+1)(1 − p)  V1(ht+1)+pβW2(μt+1,h t+1,k t+1). (43)
Also, in this case the investor breaks even with unconstrained knowledge.
Therefore, λ0 = 1 and μt =0 .W i t ha l lμ set to 0, the function W is the surplus
generated by an incumbent ﬁrm. Using this, the surplus generated by a new ﬁrm,
after the investment in knowledge and after the realization of survival, can be
written as:
  V (ht)=−τht+1 − kt+1 − wt + βW(1,h t+1,k t+1),
35from which we have   V1(ht+1)=−τ + βW2(1,h t+1,k t+1). Therefore, conditions
(42) and (43) can be rewritten as:
(1 − p)τ + τ + ϕ2(ht,h t+1;H)=β
 
π1(ht+1,k t+1,h t+2) − ϕ1(ht+1,h t+2;H)
 
(44)






The conditions for the accumulation of knowledge when the investor commits
to the contract are similar to the corresponding conditions derived earlier (see (13)
and (14)), with the exception of the constant term (1 − p)τ. The most important
d i ﬀ e r e n c ew i t hr e s p e c tt ot h ec a s ew i t hp = 1 is that now the entry cost negatively
aﬀects the steady state value of H even if the investor commits to the contract.
Higher values of p (higher survival) increase the steady state value of knowledge
because they reduce the term (1 − p)τ. This corresponds to a reduction in the
marginal cost of accumulating knowledge for both new and incumbent ﬁrms.
When both parties are unable to commit, the optimization problem can be
w r i t t e na si n( 1 9 ) ,o n c ew er e p l a c ewt − ϕ(ht,h t+1;H)w i t hU(ht,h t+1,w t;H),
discount future ﬂows by pβ, and take into account that the ﬁrm pays wt + kt+1
only in case of survival. The ﬁrst order condition for the accumulation of knowledge
of a new ﬁrm (t = 0) can be written as:




















which diﬀers from (20) only in the constant term (1 − p)τ.
Let HC be the steady state knowledge when the investor commits and HNC
when the investor does not commit. Proposition 4 can be reformulated as follows:
Proposition 7 Assume p ∈ (0,1). The steady state values of HC and HNC are
both strictly decreasing in τ. Moreover, there exists ¯ τ>0 such that HNC >H C
for τ<¯ τ and HNC <H C for τ>¯ τ.
Barriers to entry aﬀect the accumulation of knowledge even when the investor
commits to the contract. However, their negative impact is stronger with double-
sided limited commitment. The proof of the proposition, which is omitted for
economy of space, uses the same logic as the proof of Proposition 4.
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